Conflict of Laws - Characterization of Statutes of Limitation - Full Faith and Credit for Statutes by Davis, Ronald Lee
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 3
April 1954
Conflict of Laws - Characterization of Statutes of
Limitation - Full Faith and Credit for Statutes
Ronald Lee Davis
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Ronald Lee Davis, Conflict of Laws - Characterization of Statutes of Limitation - Full Faith and Credit for Statutes, 14 La. L. Rev. (1954)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss3/14
Notes
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CHARACTERIZATION OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATION-FLL FAITH AM CREDIT FOR STATUTES
Suit was instituted in a federal district court of Penn-
sylvania, based upon diversity of citizenship, on a cause of action
resulting from a death in Alabama. The section of the Alabama
Code' on which this cause of action was predicated allowed a
two-year period for instituting suit, while the general Penn-
sylvania statute of limitations allowed only one year. The action
was brought more than one year after the cause arose, but within
the two-year period allowed by the Alabama statute. The
district court 2 and the court of appeals8 dismissed the suit, apply-
ing the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Held, the Pennsylvania conflicts rule
which dictated the application of the Pennsylvania statute of
limitations did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution.4 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514
(1953).
It is a familiar rule of conflicts that in a foreign tort cause
of action the forum may apply its own procedural law, but it
must look to the lex delicti for substantive law.5 This characteri-
zation as substantive or procedural is usually decided in accord-
ance with the forum's conflicts rule.6 However, if, as was un-
successfully contended in the instant case, a substantive right
is embodied in a foreign statute, the Supreme Court has the
authority to intervene if the forum wrongfully characterized this
right as procedural.7
Statutes of limitations have been generally characterized as
procedural.8 However, in a majority of the states an exception is
recognized where a statute creates a right unknown to common
1. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1940).
2. 102 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
8. 195 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1952).
4. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
5. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 80 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 585 (1934).
6. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). For an
excellent treatment of the general topic, see Pascal, Characterization as an
Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 2 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 715 (1940).
7. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
8. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U.S. 1839).
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law and provides the time in which suit must be brought.9 The
theory is that the remedy is inseparable from the right, and a
limitation of the remedy is a limitation of the right. This par-
ticular situation was involved in the instant case, but the major-
ity concluded that this exception resulted from voluntary recog-
nition by the states and was not required by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. It therefore predicated its ruling on the broad
principle set forth in McElmoyle v. Cohen0 and upheld the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's conflicts rule.
In arriving at this conclusion the majority found it necessary
to distinguish several Supreme Court cases which did require
the application of the foreign statutory limitation." In those
cases, however, the limitation fixed by the foreign statute, but
not the forum limitation, had expired. It was held that the suit
could not be entertained by any forum, but in so holding, the
court did not classify the statutory limitation as a substantive
right. It is merely a condition of the right, the running of which
destroys the right. These cases, therefore, only require the
application of the foreign statutory limitation by the forum
after its expiration.' 2 Clearly, this would not govern the instant
case, since the general statute of limitations of the forum state,
but not the foreign statutory limitation, had run. Also, under the
doctrine of the instant case a substantive right to a cause of
action is not divested. It is merely barred from a particular
locality, and the right to enforce it in other forums in which
jurisdiction may be obtained is maintained intact.
It would appear, therefore, that the court was correct in up-
9. Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635,
48 L.R.A. 625 (4th Cir. 1900); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bruckhart, 154 Ky. 92,
157 S.W. 18, 46 L.R.A.(N.s.) 687 (1913); Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry.,
92 Minn. 184, 99 N.W. 620, 104 Am. St. Rep. 674, 2 Ann. Cas. 150 (1904).
10. 13 Pet. 312 (U.S. 1839).
11. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199 (1915); Davis v.
Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) (acceptance of a directorate); The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199 (1886) (tort action); Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, 64 F.2d 800
(5th Cir. 1933). The Alabama statute in question provides: "A personal rep-
resentative may maintain an action, and recover such damages as the jury
may assess In a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of Alabama,
and not elsewhere.... (Italics supplied.) ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1940). This
provision limiting the application of the statute to cases brought within the
State of Alabama was not mentioned in the decision.
12. In Engle v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926), the Supreme Court did
provide that in a diversity suit the federal court must allow the time stipu-
lated in the statute creating the cause of action, even though the general
statute of limitations of the state in which the court is sitting has expired.
However, the statute there applied was of federal origin, and the Court's
apparent rationale was the Intent of Congress to have its designated period
of limitation applied in all cases.
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holding the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's conflicts rule.
However, other factors must be considered.
The Wells case involved the application by the forum of a
foreign statutory cause of action. The status of statutes under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause has never been clear. As one writer
points out, "At the present time the Court seems to move cau-
tiously from case to case and from field to field, and seems to
refrain from laying down any broad rule." 13 Under the present
interpretation of this clause of the Constitution, practically all
foreign judgments must be enforced by sister states.14 A literal
reading of the clause in the Constitution would put statutes in the
same category as judgments, but except for one early dictum,15
it was not until 1912 that a state was required to give full faith
and credit to a statute of another state.16 Since this time states
have been required to enforce the domiciliary charters of frater-
nal benefit insurance companies, 17 and in some instances foreign
workmen's compensation statutes. 8 Hughes v. Fetter 9 and First
National Bank v. United Air Lines20 further enlarged this field
by requiring forums to apply the death benefit statutes of the
state in which the death occurred. In the light of these decisions,
coupled with a 1948 amendment to the Judicial Code,21 it would
appear that statutes are gradually being elevated to the position
held by judgments under full faith and credit. The Wells case
13. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Law, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581,
587 (1952).
14. The two real grounds for refusing enforcement are lack of jurisdic-
tion by the rendering state and the fact that the judgment was based on a
penal law. This latter defense has been weakened somewhat by Milwaukee
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
15. "Without doubt the constitutional requirement . . . implies that the
public acts of every state shall be given the same effect by the courts of
another state that they have by law and usage at home." Waite, C.J., in
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887).
16. In Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912), Wisconsin was required
to allow a suit under a Minnesota statute imposing certain liabilities upon
the stockholders of bankrupt Minnesota corporations.
17. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938);
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
18. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), Ver-
mont was required to give full faith and credit to a New Hampshire work-
men's compensation law on the grounds that the law was self executing.
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) and Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935),
have all but limited the Bradford case to its facts. However, see Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) and Industrial Comm. of Wiscon-
sin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) which would apparently advocate a
return to the law under the Bradford case.
19. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
20. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1950).
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could, however, represent a change of position by the Supreme
Court.
The basic conflict in the Hughes and First National Bank
cases was the clash between the strong unifying force of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the public policy of the forum
state.22 Applying this test to the instant case the conflict would
again be present. On the one hand would be the public policy of
Pennsylvania allowing only one year for such a suit, while on the
other would be the unifying force of full faith and credit, requir-
ing that the whole of the Alabama statute be applied in the courts
by Pennsylvania. Balancing the equities it would appear that
Pennsylvania's policy should prevail, since full faith and credit
would require double the normal one-year period allowed for
the institution of such suits. However, the Supreme Court chose
to distinguish the Hughes and First National Bank cases from
the Wells case by stating that their crucial factor was the uneven
hand laid by the forum on causes of action arising within and
without the forum state. The Wells case therefore limits the
Hughes and First National Bank cases, and creates further doubt
as to the enforcement of statutes under full faith and credit.
Under Swift v. Tyson,23 where jurisdiction existed because
of diversity of citizenship, the federal courts were only bound by
state court decisions on questions of a local or extra-territorial
nature. On all matters of "general" law, the federal courts were
free to substitute their judgment for that of the state courts. The
policy behind this decision was uniformity, but it failed because
the state courts tenaciously held to their rights, and the rather
anomalous situation developed in which the state courts would
reach one result, and a federal court sitting in the same area
would reach an exact opposite result. A plaintiff could, therefore,
in many instances control the result of litigation by selecting
either a federal or state court.2 4 The Supreme Court sought to
destroy this highly inequitable situation by expressly overruling
22. "The more basic conflict involved in this particular appeal, however,
is as follows: On the one hand is the strong unifying principle embodied in
the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in
each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes
of sister states; on the other hand is the policy of Wisconsin, as interpreted
by its highest court, against permitting Wisconsin to entertain this wrongful
death action. We hold that Wisconsin's policy must give way." Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
23. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
24. See Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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Swift v. Tyson25 in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,28 which held that
federal courts are at all times bound by the state substantive
law. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 27 and Angel v. Bullington28
further extended the Erie doctrine by declaring that neither
equity nor a procedural characterization should be used by the
federal courts in order to reach a result different from that which
would be reached by the state courts. 29 Applying this principle
to the Wells case, a federal court sitting in Pennsylvania would
be bound by the Pennyslvania statute of limitations, and in
Rosenzweig v. Heller"° the Pennsylvania Supreme Court an-
nounced that in such a situation as this the Pennsylvania statute
of limitations would control. A federal court would reach a result
different from that of the state if it entertained the suit and gave
judgment for the plaintiff. The Wells case, therefore, appears to
be consistent with the Erie doctrine as announced by the Guar-
anty Trust Co. and Angel decisions.
The Wells case reaches a sound result by clarifying confus-
ing and technical questions concerning the substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of statutes of limitations and also accords with
the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins as extended by subsequent
cases.
Ronald Lee Davis
25. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
28. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
29. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), the Court said:
"It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized
either as 'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions in any use
of those terms unrelated to the specific issue before us. Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. . . . In
essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome
of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court."
30. 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl. 346 (1931). There, the factual situation was the
same as that present in the Wells case. It involved a wrongful death action,
and the prescriptive period allowed in the foreign statute was longer than
the general Pennsylvania statute of limitations. The court held that the
Pennsylvania limitation was controlling. This decision also represents the
Pennsylvania conflict of laws rule. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941), extends the Erie doctrine by requiring the federal courts
to follow the conflicts rule of the forum. The purpose is again to prevent
state and federal courts from reaching different results. Under this doctrine
the conflicts rule of Pennsylvania should be applied in the Wells case, and
this will require the application of the Pennsylvania statute of limitations.
